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Group Fraud: Fault or Duty?
William J. Moore*
To this warre of every man against every man . ..nothing
can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and
Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common
Power, there is no Law; where no Law, no Injustice. Force,
and Fraud, are in warre, the two Cardinall vertues.
Hobbes, Leviathan.'
T HF VAST INCREASE of corporate and organizational advertis-
ing2 through mass media is posing difficult problems for
the law. Numerous articles have been written on the Federal
Trade Commission's control of false advertising,3 but little
thought or study has been given to private law remedies in rela-
tion to these organizational strategies. The traditional notions of
fraud are premised upon a bargaining, individualistic society
which stresses the notions of "fault" and "honesty," and not
upon a highly institutionalized economy, in which these notions
of "fair play" are highly irrelevant to the consumer.
Indeed, the classic formula for fraud and deceit is intended
to limit the strategies used by parties in the bargaining process.
And the function of the formula is to uphold the reasonable
expectations of the "honest" party4 to the transaction. On the
other side of the coin, the common law developed the individual-
istic notion of fault in the form of "scienter" or "an intention to
deceive." 5 This notion of fault is not exclusive with fraud and
deceit but runs all through the common law; in criminal law it is
called mens rea in which a defendant may not be found guilty
*Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Toledo College of Law.
1 In Cohen and Cohen, Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy
382 (1951).
2 The generic term advertising can include false representations in T.V.,
radio, newspapers, direct mail, brochures, catalogs, sales talk, etc. We are
not primarily concerned here with labeling devices or corporate trade
names.
3 See particularly the Symposium on Advertised-Product Liability in 8
Clev-Mar. L. Rev. (1959). Also, Barnes, False Advertising, 23 Ohio St. L. J.
597 (1962).
4 See Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 583 (1958). Some of the legal rules developed to determine whether
the plaintiff's expectations are reasonable are "reliance," ". opinion," and
"materiality."
5 Ibid.
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unless there is both an intent and the act. These are the neces-
sary ingredients of a crime which is malum in se. In a rough
sort of a way, the courts in the fraud cases have said they would
not protect the purchaser's reasonable economic expectations if
the seller's conduct falls below that which they considered fair.
Recently, this legal bastion of "fairness" and "fault" has
been assaulted by courts, administrative agencies, and legal
scholars. The walls are still standing, but here and there cracks
have begun to appear and the words status and duty are no
longer obscene in the field of seller's liability for false and mis-
leading representations. A thorough study would require an
analysis of all the environmental factors( in a group-institutional-
ized society and also the interests the courts are protecting. This
paper will touch on judicial protection of the consumer's in-
terest in physical integrity, and the protection of consumer eco-
nomic expectations where these interests have been harmed by
the false representations.
I. Concepts and Formulae Should Be Rejected
Probably no area of the law is as conceptually confusing as
that of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation. The sub-rules and
the sub-sub-rules surrounding the notion of fraud are numerous
and conflicting. To further confuse the observer, the writers
in the field have advocated various theories of recovery for
similar fact patterns.8 The net result appears to be a legal
anarchy not unlike Hobbes' "warre of every man against every
man." It is true, of course, that this formula approach is evasive.
The formulae of fraud, deceit, etc. are at one end and at the
other we have the factual dispute itself. It is also true that the
theories, rules, or formulae ask the wrong questions and fail to
give a satisfactory answer to what they do ask. This does not
mean, however, that we should give up, become discouraged, or
say that it is basically a fact question which will be decided by
6 These environmental factors are used to show, in a general way, the
change from a mercantile, trading society to a highly specialized group
society. W. H. Whyte, Jr., in his book, The Organization Man (1956), calls
it the change from the protestant ethic to the social ethic.
7 Areas of interpretation have included 1) misrepresentation of a fact,
2) knowledge of its falsity, 3) materiality, 4) inducement, reliance, and
5) damage. See Prosser, Torts, § 86 at 523 (2d ed. 1955); 1 Encyc. of Negli-
gence, §§ 297-306 (1962).
8 Infra, n. 33, 34, and 35.
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the jury.9 The real questions are whether we should eliminate
the notion of "fault," and the factors to be considered in de-
termining a seller's liability for deceit in our modern society. I
believe that some of the more important factors, even more im-
portant than the ambiguous rules of scienter, opinion, reliance,
and materiality, are the following:
1. The character and status of the parties to the transaction
The common law has recognized this factor to a certain de-
gree by placing a higher duty upon the seller where there is a
confidential or fiduciary relationship. In this situation the courts
have done away with the strict requirements of scienter and
created a "constructive fraud" doctrine.' 0 Similarly the com-
petency or capacity of a party has been used to impose a duty
where none would have existed without the disability." But all
of these concepts are of a bilateral nature and fail to recognize
the true nature of our economy. Of far more significance today
is the highly organized nature of the manufacturer-distributor-
seller in our economy and the highly unorganized and inarticu-
late nature of the consumers. The consumer co-operatives are
few in number and the consumer magazines and Better Business
Bureaus are of doubtful value. Also, Professor Galbraith's theory
of countervailing power' 2 has never worked with conspicuous
success from the consumer's point of view. Its only manifestation
has been to create larger federal agencies to control the strategies
used by the manufacturer-suppliers.
2. The degree of "standardization" or "institutionalization" of the
property transaction and the type of arena in which the trans-
fer takes place
It is axiomatic that when an organization is in its beginning
stages and before the lines of responsibility and function are
drawn, a great amount of wheeling and dealing is permissible.
9 Green, Deceit, 16 Va. L. Rev. 749 (1930). Professor Green suggests that
"much of the talk of the judges in many of the earlier cases . . . sounds
strange. Perhaps much of this language has made judges feel that it was
necessary to find ways to leave troublesome cases to juries, so that the jury,
unembarrassed by history, might do what the judge would like to see done,"
at p. 770.
10 24 Ohio Jur. 2d 626, Fraud and Deceit, § 9; Sheffer v. Sheffer, 16 Ohio
App. 305, 32 O.C.A. 469 (1922).
11 24 Ohio Jur. 2d 627, Fraud and Deceit, § 10.
12 Galbraith, American Capitalism (1952).
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As the organization matures and when its true purpose and func-
tion have solidified, this freeplay is no longer permitted. People
have come to rely upon certain actions and characteristics and
the law will not permit any deviation. The same thing is true
in the process of trading. Professor Green states that:
The insurance contract and the oil and gas lease are ex-
cellent examples of how even important contracts pass
through stages of development before they become well for-
mulated. In the transactions of more or less undeveloped pat-
terns the doctrines of "actual fraud" and sometimes of neg-
ligence are employed as means of permitting leeway in keep-
ing with the demands of the interests and the habits of the
people they serve.' 3
In the thirty-four years since Professor Green's article was
written our economy has developed many more standardized sit-
uations. The growth of chain stores, supermarkets, bargain-barns,
etc. has reduced almost all personal property transactions to the
level of take-it-or-leave-it and not of the bargain and "horse"
trade nature.
3. The relative base value position of the parties to the
transaction
This includes all the values in our society and particularly
those of wealth, power, and knowledge. In a recent article cov-
ering the subject of false advertising, the writer stated:
• . . whether we consider the quality of pre-packaged foods,
the efficacy of drugs, the composition of textiles, the identity
of artfully processed furs, the composition of metal products
. . . motors. . . appliances. . . the consumer or buyer is in-
escapably dependent upon the representations . . . made by
the seller. And even in those areas where the consumer is
presumably competent to make a judgment . . . the hectic
pace of contemporary living seldom permits him to go beyond
such comparison shopping as is possible on the basis of the
price advertisements appearing in the daily press.1
4
Even here, of course, the enormous disparity between the parties
of knowledge prevents any rational selection. The manufacturer
has usually covered or wrapped his product in an attractive pack-
age and through saturation advertising has attempted to make
the purchasers' choice depend upon a brand name or some other
13 Green, op. cit. supra n. 9 at 751.
14 Barnes, False Advertising, 23 Ohio St. L. J. 597, 602 (1962).
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irrational factor.' 5 The inherent qualities of the product are
frequently ignored, and the seller-advertising agency has aimed
at subconscious, even Freudian, factors. When the product is not
packaged, as in the case of automobiles or appliances, the con-
sumer is also at a disadvantage. The complexity of automatic
transmissions, refrigeration mechanisms and the like have re-
duced the average consumer's selection to that of styling com-
parisons.' The impact of these environmental factors eliminates
any notion of rational bargaining and therefore, in the proper
instances, the legal doctrines of "fault," "reliance," and "privity."
4. The outcome and effects manufacturer-supplier strategies
have upon the consumer-public
On the general level it has been argued that false and mis-
leading advertising is bad for the economy in general. It fosters
a decrease in Consumer Confidence and it operates as a sort of
Gresham's law. That is, one bad, unethical advertiser by his
disreputable representations can force the rest of the industry to
make similar claims.' 7 On a more specific level, the courts have
always focused upon the effect or impact a representation had
upon a particular plaintiff.
H. Protection of Consumer's Interest in Physical Integrity
The courts have been more eager to extend the notion of the
vendor's duty and obligation to the public in the physical injury
cases. 18 Where a consumer has relied upon a manufacturer-sup-
plier representation and this reliance has resulted in physical in-
jury, recent cases have imposed a strict liability, free from any
notions of fault, upon the supplier. The initial judicial focus was
15 Treece, Copying Methods of Product Differentiation, 38 Notre Dame Law.
244, 258 (1963).
16 Barnes, op. cit. supra n. 14 at 603.
17 State v. Schaengold, 13 Ohio L. Rep. 130, 89 A.L.R. 1005 (1915). The
court, in upholding the constitutionality of the Ohio false advertising law,
said, "some merchants and manufacturers have wilfully misrepresented
their wares, thereby ... injuring the honest business man who will not re-
sort to dishonest and alluring advertising to obtain trade. And if this prac-
tice is not curbed it can readily be seen that the honest business man will
be compelled by the competition in his business to do likewise." Id. at 132.
18 James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative
Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 537 (1952); McNiece and Thornton, Is the Law
of Negligence Obsolete? 26 St. John's L. Rev. 255 (1952); James, Some Re-
flections on the Bases of Strict Liability, 18 La. L. Rev. 293 (1958); Prosser,
Strict Liability to the Consumer, 69 Yale L. J. 1099 (1960).
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on the effect of the misleading advertisement. Since the effect
was the elimination of hair from a girl's head, 19 or dynamite in-
jury,20 or burns from highly inflammable hula skirt,21 or auto
tire failure2 2 resulting in physical injuries, it is not too suprising
that the courts have picked out the warranty formula amongst
the deceit-negligence-negligent misrepresentation-warranty-estop-
pel theories of recovery.23
These courts have rejected the outmoded, individualistic
bargaining ideas of privity and placed responsibility directly
upon the originator of the advertisement; thereby taking notice
of the true nature of the conflict. Most of these cases have stressed
the environmental factors of the property transactions in elimi-
nating the "privity" requirement. In a recent case the plaintiff
was injured while working with dynamite produced by DuPont
but sold by an intermediate distributor. The court in rejecting
the notion of privity said:
We know that a given article may pass through several
hands after it leaves the factory and that retailers or middle-
men are mere "conduits . . . through which the manu-
facturer distributes his goods" (citing the Ohio case of Rogers
v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 NE 2d at 615). Thus, the
consumer has come to rely more and more upon the repre-
sentations and reputation of the manufacturer and less and
less upon those of the retailer. This reliance is particularly
justified where the articles are either sold in sealed con-
tainers or are otherwise of such a nature that no consumer
could reasonably rely upon anyone but the manufacturer to
detect or prevent latent defects.2 4
This case and others have relied upon all the environmental
factors mentioned previously to determine whether the con-
sumers' expectations should be given judicial sanctions. The
courts, at one place or another, have mentioned the highly or-
ganized nature of marketing in which the retailer is a mere
19 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N. E. 2d 612,
75 A. L. R. 2d 103 (1958).
20 Arfons v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 261 F. 2d 434 (2d Cir. 1958).
21 Brown v. Chapman, 304 F. 2d 149, 198 F. Supp. 78 (9th Cir. 1962). This
case, however, involved implied warranties and not direct, express repre-
sentations by the defendant.
22 Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F. 2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960).
23 But in Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent, supra, n. 19 at 252, 253, Judge
Taft in a concurring opinion said the plaintiff's petition raised a good cause
of action for negligence, deceit, or innocent misrepresentation.
24 Arfons v. E. I. DuPont et al., supra, n. 20 at 436.
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"conduit," the standardization of consumer purchases, and the
wide gap in knowledge about the product.25 The same line of
rationale has been applied in other fact situations and is not
logically or realistically limited to inherently dangerous products
such as dynamite. Nor is it logically limited to food, drug, and
cosmetic cases.
Judge Kaufman in the Du Pont case said, "We do not read
the Rogers case as merely another step along a well traveled
road. That decision blazed a new trail .. .We cannot at this
point say that the Rogers case is limited to its particular
facts. .... , 26
The trend in the cases involving a false representation and
physical injuries has been away from any individualistic notion
of fault and scienter. The courts have emphasized the social-
environmental forces in our economy, and the effect the repre-
sentations have had upon the consumer; not the subjectivities of
the manufacturer-supplier.
M. Protection of Consumer Economic Expectations
Moving away from the physical injury problem, we come to
the more typical "fraud" cases which the courts have character-
ized as protection of property interests. The private action of
fraud has usually been employed to protect the stability of sales
and credit transactions and the expectations of the parties. The
problems with the use of fraud and deceit in this area have been:
1. The difficulty of establishing the private remedy because of the
scienter requirement
Where the intentional tort theory is used most courts say an
essential element is our old friend "fault," "scienter," "dis-
honesty," or "intent to deceive." 27 A few cases, where the ef-
fect of the misrepresentation is one of injury to "property" rights,
have used the warranty doctrine and eliminated fault,28 but
25 In another warranty case involving the liability of food manufacturers
the court said: "it is usually impracticable, if not impossible, for the ulti-
mate consumer to analyze the food and ascertain whether or not it is suit-
able for human consumption." Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex.
609, 612, 164 S. W. 2d 828, 829 (1942).
26 Arfons v. E. I. DuPont et al., supra, n. 20 at 436.
27 24 Ohio Jur. 2d 703, Fraud and Deceit, § 109.
28 Prosser, supra, n. 18 at 1143, suggests there are at least four cases pro-
tecting "property." The list is small because the products involved so far
have been "intended for bodily use."
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even then the parol evidence rule would eliminate recovery for
oral misrepresentations in most instances. Furthermore, it is
around this conception of fault that the courts have become en-
gulfed in a semantic shell game. One writer has listed five pos-
sible states of mind that a seller could have in the transfer of
property.29 But for every state of mind there is probably a rule
which could be discovered by a decision-maker to justify any
result. Ohio, for instance, has purported to follow the strict
notions of scienter established in Derry v. Peek,30 but recently
the Supreme Court, in a real estate transfer case,3 1 created what
amounts to a scienter substitute. It is probably true, as sug-
gested by Professor Green in 1930, that the formula (e) adopted
by any given jurisdiction is essentially immaterial.3 2 And that
the discovery by the court or jury of a dishonest intent is essen-
tially a "gut reaction" process whereby the decision-maker
reaches an ultimate result and then pushes the correct legal but-
ton.
Other solutions to the problem have been somewhat more
conceptualistic. There have been suggestions to broaden the
negligence 33 or warranty 34 theories. Also, there have been sug-
gestions that a higher duty be placed upon sellers by analogy
to the strict responsibility for innocent misrepresentation in other
remedies.35 Since the remedies of legal and equitable rescission
29 Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 583, 589 (1958).
30 14 App. Cas. 337, 374 (1889). The court held that for an action of deceit
to lie there must be proof "that a false representation has been made (1)
knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless
whether it be true or false."
31 Pumphrey v. Quillan, 165 Ohio St. 343, 135 N. E. 2d 328 (1956). "A case
may be made against one . . . (2) who misstates his own state of mind in
regard thereto, as by saying that he knows its existence when he is con-
scious that he merely believes it to exist, or has no belief one way or the
other of its truth or falsity; (3) who asserts a fact as of his own knowledge,
or so positively as to imply that he has knowledge, when he knows that he
has not sufficient information to testify it." See 24 Ohio Jur. 2d 708, Fraud
and Deceit, § 115.
32 Green, op. cit. supra, n. 9 at 757. "Each formula is elastic enough to allow
the broadest range, both in the exercize of the court's own judgment and in
permitting the employment of a jury. Can it be that the choice of formula
is relatively immaterial?"
33 Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 Harv.
L. Rev. 733 (1929); Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations be Treated
as Negligence or Fraud, 18 Va. L. Rev. 703 (1932).
34 Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 415
(1911).
35 See Prosser, Torts, § 88 at 549 (2d ed. 1955).
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and restitution are aimed at the prevention of unjust enrich-
ment, the courts have allowed relief regardless of the seller's
honesty.36
It is interesting to note that while the courts have been
willing to discuss the social factors governing the imposition of
liability in the warranty cases, they have been unwilling to do
so in the deceit cases. As noted earlier,3 7 a few principles have
developed placing a higher duty on the seller in the confidential-
fiduciary cases. Similarly the institutionalization of the market
is given brief recognition in some of the pure business transac-
tions of credit, negotiable instruments, accounting procedures
and so forth.38 Apparently in these "business deal" cases, the
courts have felt that the value of certainty outweighs the need
for finding any subjective intent or fault. As yet, however, most
courts have not eliminated the necessity of scienter in the com-
mon, run-of-the-mill consumer transactions and they have re-
fused to take judicial notice of any of the social factors governing
their decisions.
This refusal to accept innocent misrepresentation as a
ground for recovering damages is foolish.3 9 In many other areas
of the law, when the courts and administrative bodies have dealt
36 Parmlee, Admr. v. Adolph, 28 Ohio St. 10 (1875); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Reed,
33 Ohio St. 283 (1877).
See also Mulvey v. King, 39 Ohio St. 491, 494 where the court said, "It may
be considered as well settled in this state . .. that an action for damages
caused by misrepresentation can not ordinarily be maintained, without
proof of actual fraud, or such gross negligence as amounts to fraud. When,
however, a person claims the benefit of a contract into which he has in-
duced another to enter by means of misrepresentations, however honestly
made, the same principles cannot be applied. It is then only necessary to
prove that the representation was material .... that it was false, that the
other party had a right to rely upon it, and that he was induced by it to
make the contract in order to entitle him to relief either by rescission of
the contract or by recoupment in a suit brought to enforce it."
For another retention of the benefit case see Gaisser v. Hansen, 25 Ohio
C. C. (n. s.) 262, 37 Ohio C. C. 430 (1915).
37 24 Ohio Jur. 2d, supra, n. 10.
38 Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922); Seneca Wire &
Mfg. Co. v. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 1, 159 N. E. 700 (1928); Ultramares Corp.
v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931); Rouse, Legal Liability of the
Public Accountant, 23 Ky. L. J. 1 (1934).
39 Prosser states that only thirteen jurisdictions have flatly rejected the
rule of Derry v. Peck, supra, n. 30, and all its variations and grant a cause
of action for innocent misrepresentation. Prosser, supra, n. 7 at 547. Pro-
fessor Keeton, however, states that in most of these cases the misrepre-
senter was a party to the transaction and therefore the recovery is similar
to rescission and restitution to prevent unjust enrichment. Keeton, Fraud,
5 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 583, 600 (1958).
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with group ideological and economic strategies, they have been
forced to do away with any hope of finding a single, subjective
intent. The courts placed stress upon the impact or effect of the
organizational activity and not the subjective intent. For in-
stance, in 1945, Judge L. Hand raised a "hornets' nest" of contro-
versy by his interpretation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America."9a The Judge re-
jected the necessity of finding a sole intent and said:
To read the passage as demanding any "specific intent"
makes nonsense of it, for no monopolist monopolizes un-
conscious of what he is doing. So here "Alcoa" meant to
keep, and did keep, that complete and exclusive hold upon
the ingot market with which it started. That was to "monop-
olize" the market, however innocently it otherwise pro-
ceeded. 40
Also, in the price fixing, employer boycott, market division cases,
the courts abandoned the motive test and adopted the impact-
effect test.4 1 In labor law, the early courts placed themselves in
trouble by attempting to find an "illegal objective" in certain
types of union strategies such as picketing and black-listing. 4 2
Now, however, where the union strategies are other than picket-
ing, Congress has eliminated motive as a method of judicial and
administrative control.43 Therefore, unless the effect of the pub-
licity is to stop deliveries or interfere with employees, it is per-
missible.
The Federal Trade Commission has attempted to give to
the consumer a public remedy and to protect him from misrepre-
sentations and false advertising.44 Of particular interest here,
in the private remedy of deceit, is that the Commission has re-
jected the common law notions of scienter45 and truth.46 In de-
termining whether a particular representation is unfair the Com-
mission looks for noticeable emphasis of effects upon the con-
39a 148 F. 2d 416, 153 F. Supp. 132 (2d Cir. 1945).
40 Id. at 432.
41 Burns, A Study of the Antitrust Laws (1958) at 39.
42 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L.
Ed. 797 (1911); Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930).
43 Labor-Management Relations Act (1947) § 8(b) (4) (i) & (ii) amended by
Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act (1959), Public Law 86-257,
Title VII, § 704 (a), 73 Stat. 542, 29 U. S. C. 158.
44 See supra, n. 3.
45 Gimbel Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission, 116 F. 2d 578 (2d Cir. 1941).
46 Bockenstette v. Federal Trade Commission, 134 F. 2d 369 (10th Cir. 1943).
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sumer public. The bellwether case of Charles of the Ritz 7 pro-
hibited the manufacturer from using the word "rejuvenescence"
in its advertising of face cream, and Judge Clark answered the
manufacturer's defense of "no deception" with a frank aware-
ness of the consumers' interests:
The important criterion is the net impression which the
advertisement is likely to make upon the general popu-
lace. . . And, while the wise and the worldly may well
realize the falsity of any representations that the present
product can roll back the years, there remains "that vast mul-
titude" of others who, like Ponce de Leon, still seek a per-
petual fountain of youth. As the Commission's expert fur-
ther testified, the average woman, conditioned by talk in
magazines and over the radio of "vitamins, hormones, and
God knows what," might take "rejuvenescence" to mean that
this "is one of the modern miracles" and is "something which
would actually cause her youth to be restored." It is for
this reason that the Commission may "insist upon the most
literal truthfulness" in advertisements . . . and should have
the discretion, undisturbed by the courts, to insist if it
chooses upon a form of advertising clear enough so that, in
the words of the prophet Isaiah, wayfaring men, though fools,
shall not err therein." 48
It would seem appropriate for common law courts to discard
this antiquated intent element and approach the deceit problem
in a modern, enlightened manner.
2. The highly organized nature of the manufacturer-distributor-
seller and the highly unorganized nature of the consumer-pur-
chaser permits the seller to benefit by the "accumulation"
rule
This rule states that mass production, mass advertisement,
and mass marketing of relatively inexpensive, non-durable, con-
sumer goods permit a slight amount of misrepresentation per
item. These false representations are made because (a) the
consumer is probably not misled and (b) even if he is, the dam-
ages are small and he therefore has no remedy. 4" This accumu-
lation of "fraud" over a period of time can amount to a sizeable
sum of money. Thus fraud, if it is spread over a wide base, can
47 143 F. 2d 676 (1944).
48 Id., at 679-680.
49 Alden v. Wright, 47 Minn. 225, 49 N. W. 767 (1891); Bailey v. Oatis, 85
Kan. 339, 116 P. 830 (1911); 24 Ohio Jur., 739, Fraud and Deceit, § 150.
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become a very profitable enterprise. Along with the accumula-
tion rule is the 'small differentiation' principle. This principle
states that the smaller the differentiation between products, or
the more similar they are in looks and function, the more blatant
or false the advertising will become. A brief view of the gaso-
line, hair oil, shaving cream, toothpaste and soap advertisements
will aggravate the observer with a depressing perspective.
In this latter field of small, inexpensive, consumer items, the
public remedy via the Federal Trade Commission is the most ef-
fective.50 The private remedy of fraud and deceit would be too
sporadic. And even without the halter of scienter, the common
law doctrines of proof of damages 5 1 and the limitations upon
the bringing of class actions5 2 would effectively stifle any con-
sumer revolt. But this does not mean the action of fraud, with-
out scienter, is without merit for the more expensive consumer
purchases.
Conclusion
Professor Handler, in 1929,53 suggested that people expect too
much from the law, and that changes will only come about in
false advertising when the producer-advertiser becomes more
socially conscious. Professor Handler said, "a new business
psychology must be bred" and "a regard for truth and an aversion
for falsity must be inculcated." 4 While these general con-
clusions may be correct, I would not agree that the private
remedy for fraud is entirely useless for controlling overzealous
advertisers. If some of the dated concepts, such as scienter, are
removed or brought up to date, deceit is a very useful compli-
ment to the other actions of negligence, warranty, and rescission
and restitution. Furthermore, it seems wrong to leave the in-
dividual consumer completely at the mercy of the federal and
state agencies or the self-imposed restraint of the private pro-
ducer-distributor.
50 See supra, n. 3. Also see Handler, False and Misleading Advertising, 39
Yale L. J. 22 (1929).
51 See supra, n. 49. And see, Oleck, Cases on Damages, c. 25 (1962).
52 Garfein v. Stiglitz, 260 Ky. 430, 86 S. W. 2d 155 (1935).
53 Handler, op. cit. supra, n. 50.
54 Id. at 52.
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